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2Stanev v. Bulgaria: On the Pathway to Freedom
By Oliver Lewis*
“I’m not an object, I’m a person. 
I need my freedom.”
— Rusi Stanev, to his attorney Aneta 
Genova, before the European Court of 
Human Rights Grand Chamber hearing 
in his case, February 2011
intrODuctiOn
In this article, I suggest that the January 2012 judgment of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in Stanev v. Bulgaria1 takes us 
a few steps along the path towards free-
dom. Rather like a Franz Kafka novel, the judgment is a story 
about an ordinary person who became entangled in a web of 
antiquated laws and perverse processes, and who ended up in a 
grotesque situation from which he found it impossible to extri-
cate himself. Rusi Stanev, the applicant, is an extraordinarily 
tenacious man who faced State absurdity and abuse, and who 
risked retribution by putting Bulgaria in the dock at the ECtHR 
in Strasbourg, and won. His life and his case are unique, but his 
is the voice of millions of others’ that we will never hear. They 
are — like he was — locked away and silenced.
On December 10, 2002, when he was 46-years old, an ambu-
lance picked up Rusi Stanev at his home where he lived alone. 
He was bundled inside and driven 400km to an institution for 
“adults with mental disorders.” His transfer into the institution 
was arranged through an agreement by a municipal official 
acting as Mr Stanev’s guardian (the guardian had never met Mr. 
Stanev and signed off on the institutional placement a mere six 
days after becoming his guardian) and the institution’s director. 
It was arranged on the basis that Mr. Stanev had a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia and that his relatives did not want to care for 
him. Mr. Stanev knew nothing about this agreement and did not 
want to leave his home. No one told him how long he would stay 
in the institution, or why he was being taken there. Two years 
earlier, the Ruse Regional Court had restricted his legal capacity. 
He was not notified about or allowed to participate in the 
proceedings that led to this determination. Once under guardian-
ship, Mr. Stanev was prohibited by law from making any deci-
sions about his own life.2 He had unsuccessfully appealed the 
court decision a year later. In 2005, the 
director of the institution was appointed 
Mr. Stanev’s guardian.3
Mr. Stanev filed his application to 
the ECtHR with the assistance of the 
Bulgarian Helsinki Committee and the 
Mental Disability Advocacy Center, two 
non-governmental organizations, on 
September 8, 2006. There was an oral 
hearing before a seven-judge Chamber 
on November 10, 2009, and the Chamber 
issued its admissibility decision on June 
29, 2010. On September 14, 2010 the 
Chamber relinquished the case to the 
Grand Chamber, which is the ECtHR’s highest body comprised 
of seventeen judges. On February 9, 2011, an oral hearing took 
place before the Grand Chamber, and the judgement was issued 
on January 17, 2012, some six years and four months after Mr 
Stanev filed his case.
The Grand Chamber held that Mr. Stanev had been deprived 
of his liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) because he was under constant 
supervision in the institution and was not free to leave without 
permission. The Court found a violation of Article 5(1) of the 
ECHR because his detention was not based on his mental health 
status (which remained largely irrelevant to his placement) and 
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3that there was no need to detain him. The Court also found 
a violation of Article 5(4) of the ECHR (which sets out the 
right to a court review of detention) because the Bulgarian law 
allowed Mr. Stanev no opportunity to have the lawfulness of his 
detention assessed by an independent judicial body; as a person 
whose legal capacity had been stripped, he had no legal standing 
to litigate. The Court also found a violation of Article 5(5) of 
the ECHR (which sets out a right to domestic compensation 
for a violation of Article 5). Of global jurisprudential signifi-
cance, the Court found that the conditions of the detention were 
“degrading,” in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. Although the 
Court found a violation of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 
of the ECHR because Bulgarian law provided no mechanism for 
Mr. Stanev to seek restoration of his legal capacity, the Court, by 
thirteen votes to four, declined to look into the substance of the 
complaints about the deprivation of legal capacity, argued by the 
applicant under Article 8 of the ECHR (which sets out the right 
to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence). 
The judgment contains two partly dissenting judgments, both of 
which depart from the majority on the Article 8 point. The Court 
awarded Mr. Stanev compensation of €15,000.
This article does not address each of these findings in turn, 
as it is impossible to do justice to the entirety of the 65-page 
judgment and partly dissenting opinions. Instead, the rest of this 
article highlights three substantive issues. The first section looks 
at the Court’s treatment of the living conditions in the institution, 
the second section examines the Court’s discussion of whether 
Mr. Stanev was deprived of his liberty, and the third section 
looks at the Court’s (mis)handling of Mr. Stanev’s legal capacity 
complaints. I then offer some conclusions.
living cOnDitiOns were DegraDing
The social care institution in which Mr. Stanev found himself 
was “accessible via a dirt track from the village of Pastra, the 
nearest locality 8km away,”4 in a village located in a “secluded 
mountainous area (some 800 m above sea level), near a hydro-
electric power station,”5 in southwest Bulgaria. Mr. Stanev 
was placed in Block 3 of the home, which was “reserved for 
residents with the least serious health problems, who were able 
to move around the premises.”6
A BBC journalist had visited Pastra in December 2002 
and found that some of the residents “had no shoes and socks 
although it’s minus ten degrees [Celsius] outside.” The journalist 
reported that “[o]ne in ten residents did not survive the past 
year — and there is no reason to expect it to be any different 
this year.”7
It was not just the BBC that visited the institution. Of huge 
significance for Mr. Stanev’s international litigation given 
its documentary credibility, a delegation of the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) carried out a 
periodic visit to Bulgaria in December 2003. Their mission 
included a trip to the Pastra institution. The CPT found that in 
Blocks 1 and 2 the temperature at midday at the time of the visit 
in December was twelve degrees Celsius. In Block 3, where 
Mr. Stanev was held, the CPT found “somewhat better heating,” 
although “residents indicated that it had been on all the time 
since the delegation’s arrival.”8
The residents’ clothes were bundled together and handed out 
randomly to the residents, a situation about which the ECtHR 
commented “was likely to arouse a feeling of inferiority in the 
residents.”9 The CPT documented that residents had access to the 
bathroom once a week, and that the bathroom to which Mr. Stanev 
had access was “rudimentary and dilapidated.”10 The CPT also 
found that:
The so-called “toilets”, also located in the yards, repre-
sented decrepit shelters with holes dug in the ground. 
The state of these facilities was execrable; further, 
walking to them on the frozen, slippery ground was 
potentially dangerous, especially at night. Residents 
visibly used the surrounding outside area as a toilet.11
As well as the BBC and the CPT, Amnesty International also 
visited the Pastra institution one year earlier. Amnesty’s report is 
more graphic than the CPT’s. They found that the toilet:
[…] was some 30 metres away along a snow-covered 
path in an outhouse. Faeces blocked the hole in the 
ground and covered the snow around the outhouse. In 
block number two there were three rooms on the first 
floor, with one, four and seven beds respectively. Some 
beds had no mattresses and a few did not even have 
spring frames but only flat metal bars. When asked 
how the residents sleep in such beds the orderly replied 
to an Amnesty International representative that they 
put their coats across the metal bars and then lie on 
top. The orderly also explained that lights are centrally 
controlled and switched off at midnight. The residents 
were ordered to rise at 4am. When questioned about the 
rationale for such early awakening he stated: “Just so! 
Sometimes it can vary. It depends!” This was a clear 
admission of abuse of power by the staff.12
The CPT found that there was one TV set owned by one 
of the residents, but generally that, “[n]o therapeutic activities 
whatsoever were organised for the residents, whose lives were 
characterised by passivity and monotony.”13 The institution’s 
daily budget for food per person was the equivalent of $0.89.14 
The CPT delegation was so appalled with the situation that 
at the end of its mission to Bulgaria it made an immediate 
observation,15 finding that “the conditions witnessed at this 
Pastra. © Yana Buhrer Tavanier, 2009
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4establishment could be said to amount to inhuman and degrading 
treatment.” The CPT urged the Bulgarian government to urgently 
replace the institution with a facility in conformity with modern 
standards. Responding to this in February 2004, the Bulgarian 
government promised that the Pastra institution “would be closed 
as a matter of priority.”16 This turned out to be entirely vacuous: 
the Pastra institution remains operational to this day. To highlight 
the situation, the CPT went back in October 2010, but its report 
on this mission is not yet public.17
In its judgment, the ECtHR relied extensively on the CPT’s 
documentation in finding that the living conditions in which 
Mr. Stanev was forced to spend approximately seven years 
amounted to “degrading treatment,”18 in violation of Article 3 
of the ECHR, which sets out the absolute prohibition against 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In the 
international litigation, the Bulgarian government pleaded a lack 
of financial resources in justifying its inaction in closing the 
Pastra institution, an argument that the ECtHR found irrelevant 
as justification for keeping Mr. Stanev in such conditions.19 
Stanev is the first case in which the ECtHR has found a viola-
tion of Article 3 of the ECHR in any sort of institution for people 
with disabilities.
liberty was DenieD
Mr. Stanev alleged that he had 
been detained for the purposes 
of Article 5(1)(e) of the ECHR, 
which sets out an exhaustive set 
of circumstances when in which 
the State can legally deprive 
an individual of their liberty, 
including for people of “unsound 
mind.” Case-law has fleshed 
out what this antiquated phrase 
means, but the ECtHR has never 
been asked to decide whether a 
resident of a social care institution 
was detained for the purposes 
of Article 5 of the ECHR. Its 
previous case-law has largely 
concerned compulsory detention 
under mental health legislation in psychiatric wards/hospitals, 
which the Court has generally found acceptable as long as there 
are safeguards.20 If Mr. Stanev was detained for the purposes of 
Article 5(1) of the ECHR, then (according to Article 5(4)) he 
should have been entitled to have the lawfulness of the detention 
reviewed by an independent court.
The seventeen judges of the Grand Chamber saw the public 
policy implications clearly. No one knows how many people 
with disabilities are in social care institutions, but my estima-
tion is that the figure is upwards of 2.5 million in the Council 
of Europe region.21 It appears from the judgment that the Grand 
Chamber judges did not want to open the proverbial floodgates. 
At the outset of the discussion on Article 5, the judgment goes 
to pains to state that, “it is unnecessary in the present case to 
determine whether, in general terms, any placement of a legally 
incapacitated person in a social care institution constitutes a 
‘deprivation of liberty’ within the meaning of Article 5(1) [of 
the ECHR].”22 The judgment, we are told, does not “rule on 
the obligations that may arise under the Convention for the 
authorities in such situations.”23
That said, The ECtHR found that Mr. Stanev’s detention was 
attributable to the national authorities because he was placed 
in a State-run institution that did not interview him before the 
placement.24 He was not given an opportunity to express his 
opinion about the guardian’s decision, even though he could 
have given it.25 He was not transferred to the institution on his 
request,26 and the restrictions complained of were the result of 
the (in)actions of public.27 The Court found that in the particular 
circumstances, with many caveats, without making any policy 
generalities, and only in this case, Mr. Stanev was deprived of 
his liberty in Article 5 terms.
The particular circumstances included the following findings 
of fact. Mr. Stanev needed staff permission before going to the 
nearest village.28 He had three leaves of absence of about ten 
days each, which were “entirely at the discretion of the home’s 
management,”29 and he needed to travel 400km to get home, 
making his journey “difficult and expensive […] in view of his 
income and his ability to make his own travel arrangements.”30 
He was returned to the institution without regard to his wishes 
when he failed to return from 
a leave of absence in 2006.31 
Furthermore, his identity papers 
were constantly held by the insti-
tution, which, the ECtHR found, 
placed “significant restrictions 
on his personal liberty.”32
The Court found that Mr. 
Stanev was not at any health risk 
that might have warranted deten-
tion, and that he was “under con-
stant supervision and was not free 
to leave the home without per-
mission whenever he wished.”33 
Having lived in the institution for 
eight years, the Court found that 
he was likely to have felt “the full 
adverse effects of the restrictions 
imposed on him.”34 In address-
ing the subjective aspect of Article 5, the Court noted that Mr. 
Stanev had actively complained of being in the institution and had 
attempted to leave legally. For all these reasons the Court found 
that he had been detained. The question remained: was the depri-
vation of liberty lawful under Article 5(1) of the ECHR?
Answering this question in the affirmative, the Court stated 
what I think is the most important sentence in the whole judgment:
It seems clear to the Court that if the applicant had 
not been deprived of legal capacity on account of his 
mental disorder, he would not have been deprived of 
his liberty.35
This is the closest the Stanev Court comes to a policy analy-
sis. The de-coupling of guardianship and other human rights 
violations is a topic now well-established, and the Court will be 
presented with more cases in the future which will tease apart 
the intimate relationship between detention in an institution 
“Stanev is the first case 
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3 of the ECHR in any sort 
of institution for people 
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5and deprivation of legal capacity. Because the 
freshest medical report was two years old when 
Mr. Stanev was placed into the institution, 
the Court was convinced that the detention 
was not “in accordance with a procedure 
prescribed by law” under Article 5(1)(e) of 
the ECHR, and it therefore found a violation 
under this heading.
legal capacity was harDly exaMineD
Mr. Stanev argued that his right to a fair 
trial (due process rights set out in Article 6 of 
the ECHR) and his right to respect for private 
life (Article 8 of the ECHR) were violated 
as a result of being deprived of legal capac-
ity and being placed under guardianship. As 
already noted, the ECtHR found a violation 
of Article 6 on the basis that Bulgarian law 
did not guarantee with sufficient degree 
of certainty access for Mr. Stanev to seek 
restoration of his legal capacity.36 This is 
a welcome finding, as it is predictable and 
technocratic. Of more jurisprudential interest is the range of 
human rights that are automatically compromised as a result 
of the deprivation of legal capacity.
Mr. Stanev argued these 
points at considerable length 
under Article 8 of the ECHR. 
The Court refused to even 
entertain these arguments, 
and thirteen out of the sev-
enteen judges found abruptly 
that “no separate issue arises 
under Article 8.” One can only 
speculate as to why the major-
ity decided this way. Perhaps 
at sixty-one pages, the judges 
thought that the judgment was 
lengthy enough, or has cov-
ered enough terrain already. 
Perhaps they simply ran out 
of steam, or time. Perhaps 
they were in a rush to clear 
the backlog of other cases. 
Alternatively, (although to 
be clear, they do not put it 
in these terms), perhaps the 
Grand Chamber was will-
ing to offer the State a wide 
“margin of appreciation” and 
was reluctant to provide broad 
policy guidance in an area 
where there is not yet clear 
common ground amongst 
the member States (let alone 
among the judges) on an issue 
they consider to be a social 
or moral one, notwithstanding 
the existence of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities.37
Whatever the reason for the Court’s approach, their hand-
ing of the legal capacity claims stands in sharp contrast to its 
existing body of case law.38 In its 2008 judgment in Shtukaturov 
v. Russia, the Court established that the “interference with the 
applicant’s private life was very serious. As a result of his inca-
pacitation the applicant became fully dependant on his official 
guardian in almost all areas of life.”39 In the Shtukaturov case, 
the applicant was placed under guardianship without his knowl-
edge, and was sent by his guardian to a psychiatric hospital for 
seven months. In the Stanev case, the applicant was sent by his 
guardian to a social care institution for seven years.
The Stanev judgment is appended by two separate partly 
dissenting opinions, the first by the judges from Belgium and 
Luxembourg (who are both Vice Presidents of the Court, i.e. 
very senior) and Estonia, and the second by Judge Kalaydjieva 
from Bulgaria (who herself is from Bulgaria and used to work 
as a human rights attorney). Both opinions regret that the Court 
failed to investigate the Article 8 claims, with Judge Kalaydjieva 
correctly identifying legal capacity as “the primary issue” in the 
case. She notes that the government offered no justification for 
Mr. Stanev’s preferences being ignored, and that “instead of due 
assistance from his officially appointed guardian, the pursuit of 
his best interests was made completely dependent on the good 
will or neglect shown by the guardian.”
Judge Kalaydjieva writes that she would have found a viola-
tion of Article 8 of the ECHR, stridently setting out that the 
Bulgarian law “failed to meet contemporary standards for ensur-
ing the necessary respect for the wishes and preferences he was 
capable of expressing.” This language of contemporary stan-
dards is, in my view, code for Article 12 of the UN Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which sets 
out that everyone with disabilities should have legal capacity on 
an equal basis with others, and that the State is required to make 
assistance available to those who need help in exercising their 
An overcoat is placed on the bed instead of mattress,' explained an orderly in Pastra.  
© Amnesty International, 2002
Mr. Rusi Stanev in front of the 
European Court of Human Rights 
in Strasbourg. © Mental Disability 
Advocacy Center, 2010
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6legal capacity. It should be pointed out, however, that Bulgaria 
had not ratified the CRPD when the violations took place, so 
Bulgaria was not legally bound by its provisions.
Judge Kalaydjieva further notes the access to justice argu-
ment which was missed in the majority judgment; namely that 
Mr Stanev had to rely totally on the discretion of the guardian 
to initiate legal proceedings to restore his legal capacity, and 
to get out of the institution. Her insight highlights the way in 
which guardianship and institutionalization conspire not only to 
invalidate a person’s will and preferences, but how they segre-
gate people from our societies, exclude them from the political 
sphere and erase them from our legal consciousness.
cOnclusiOns
I would like to make two concluding remarks. First, that the 
Court should engage with developments in United Nations human 
rights law. Second, that despite its weaknesses, the Stanev judg-
ment is a significant advance in international human rights law.
First, Stanev is the latest example of how the ECtHR is 
unwilling to interpret the ECHR in the light of UN human rights 
treaties, in this case the CRPD.40 One frustration is that CRPD 
provisions do not map neatly onto the ECHR, but the main 
frustration is that the Court is not even engaging with what the 
CRPD has to say. The ECHR was written in the late 1940s, and it 
is likely that none of the drafters had a situation similar to Stanev 
in mind. By contrast, the CRPD is a document adopted in 2006, 
drafted largely by experts (many of whom were people with 
disabilities) who knew the features of guardianship and institu-
tionalization very well. Its provisions — in particular Articles 12 
and 19 — speak directly to a Stanev scenario.
The ECtHR first cited the CRPD in 2009, three years after its 
adoption, in the case of Glor v. Switzerland.41 The Court stated 
that the CRPD represents a European and universal consensus 
on the necessity of addressing the treatment of people with 
disabilities. Although these are encouraging words, the Court 
did not rely on the CRPD in finding in that case for the first 
time that disability constituted a “status” as a protected ground 
of discrimination under Article 14 of the ECHR; or that people 
with disabilities constitute a vulnerable group for whom the 
State’s margin of appreciation to permit differential treatment 
should be narrow. More surprisingly, in very important judg-
ments concerning the right to legal capacity in 2008,42 2009,43 
and 2011,44 the Court failed even to mention the CRPD, despite 
legal capacity being a central concern in each of the cases, and 
a central feature of the CRPD. In a 2010 judgment on the right 
to vote of a person deprived of legal capacity, the Court cited 
the CRPD in passing but failed to use it in its analysis,45 and 
in a case against the UK in the same year, the Court mentioned 
offhand that the amicus curiae brief had cited the CRPD in its 
submissions.46
In a 2010 case concerning a deaf man who died in custody, 
the Court cited the CRPD early in its judgment, but despite 
the CRPD’s strong language about reasonable accommoda-
tion in detention,47 the Court did not rely on it in finding that 
“[w]here the authorities decide to place and maintain in deten-
tion a person with disabilities, they should demonstrate special 
care in guaranteeing such conditions as correspond to his spe-
cial needs resulting from his disability.”48 In a 2011 case about 
a person with HIV, the Court referenced the CRPD in relation 
to the prohibition of disability-based discrimination but did not 
cite it in the main points of the case (for example, whether HIV 
can be considered a disability which, since Glor v. Switzerland, 
is already an established prohibited ground of discrimination 
under the “other status” provision in Article 14 of the ECHR).49 
It is probably too early to conclude that the Court is being dis-
ablist in its approach, and perhaps too early to conclude that it 
is taking a different approach to that which it took following 
the 1989 adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC), although a review of the ECHR judgments from the 
1990s citing the CRC suggest a Court slightly more willing 
to weave CRC principles into its judgments than the current 
bench’s treatment of the CRPD.50
Second, the Stanev judgment is a significant advancement 
of European and global case law. Writing in 2007, Sir Nicholas 
Bratza (the President of the seventeen-judge Grand Chamber 
that adjudicated the Stanev case, and the President of the ECtHR 
itself) observed that since the first major mental health case of 
Winterwerp v. the Netherlands in 1979, “the jurisprudence of the 
Court in the succeeding twenty years is notable for the almost 
complete dearth of judicial decisions in this vitally important 
area.” He goes on to explain that, “This gap is a reflection not 
of adequate safeguarding by member States of the Convention 
rights of those with mental disabilities but rather of the acute 
practical and legal difficulties faced by an especially vulnerable 
group of persons in asserting those rights and in bringing claims 
before both the domestic courts and the European Court.”51 
Exactly so. That Mr. Stanev was able to bring his case to the 
public attention through the international litigation is due to his 
tenacity, to non-governmental organizations, and the donors that 
“Her insight highlights the way in which guardianship 
and institutionalization conspire not only to invalidate 
a person’s will and preferences, but how they segregate 
people from our societies, exclude them from the political 
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7fund them.52 No civil legal aid is available in Bulgaria for this 
type of case, so the vast majority of cases go ignored.
The Stanev judgment has been described in the blogosphere 
as an “exciting decision,” a “huge achievement,”53 and a “land-
mark ruling.”54 My colleague Lycette Nelson, who represented 
Mr. Stanev before the Grand Chamber, describes the judgment 
as having “enormous significance.”55 The international NGO, 
Interights, which submitted an excellent amicus brief said on 
its website that, “there is no mistaking the significance of the 
Stanev judgment, which will benefit tens of thousands of per-
sons with disabilities,”56 although this seems to miscalculate the 
number of potential beneficiaries by several million.
It is surely a jurisprudential failure that the Court did not 
directly address the right to legal capacity, and it is frustrating 
that the Court is not yet willing or able to offer macro comments 
about societal exclusion of people with disabilities. I share the 
frustration, but am not yet overly concerned. The Court is not 
a UN treaty body that comments on government progress and 
makes recommendations and has a more personable relation-
ship with civil society. Nor is it an international think-tank 
or an advocacy organization. We are still in the early days of 
disability litigation: this is a relatively new and unsettled area in 
the European legal system, however backward that may seem to 
we advocates who operate in the CRPD ecosystem. The ECtHR 
is a judicial body that currently faces a barrage of criticism from 
governments for overstepping the boundary between national 
sovereignty and universal human rights. Perhaps these political 
considerations were at play in the Stanev case.
As a judicial body the Court has adjudicated the particular 
facts of the case. That it has chosen to couch the violations 
in overly narrow terms does not detract from the significant 
advances in international law. This is the first case in which 
the Court has found that a person in a disability institution 
was unlawfully deprived of liberty. This is the first case that 
the Court found that the regime and conditions of a disability 
institution violate the absolute right to be free from torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Franz Kafka once wrote that, “paths are made by walking.” 
Mr. Stanev’s case clears the path towards freedom, and towards 
a time when people with disabilities are not objectified by 
the law, but treated as full and equal subjects of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. It is now for others to take action, by 
carrying out implementation advocacy, raising judicial aware-
ness of disability rights, empowering victims of human rights 
violations to continue seek justice through the courts, and ensur-
ing the viability of organizations that enable this to happen.
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communicate observations to the competent authorities of the Party 
concerned.”
16 CPT Report at para. 34.
17 The CPT carried out a periodic visit to Bulgaria from October 
18-29, 2010 and visited the “Home for men with psychiatric  
disorders in the village of Pastra, Rila municipality.” CPT, News 
Flash,” November 3, 2010, www.cpt.coe.int.
18 Stanev at para. 212.
19 Id. at para. 210.
20 For a review of ECHR case-law on this, see chapter 2 of Peter 
Bartlett, Oliver Lewis, and Oliver Thorold Mental Disability and 
the European Convention on Human Rights, (2007).
21 In 2007, an international study estimated that there were nearly 
1.2 million people living in residential institutions for people with 
disabilities in European Union member states (the study included 
Turkey, but excluded Germany and Greece for which no data was 
available). See Jim Mansell, Martin Knapp, Julie Beadle-Brown  
and Jeni Beecham, Deinstitutionalisation and community living  
— outcomes and costs: report of a European Study 26 (2007).  
My estimate of upwards of 2.5 million is based on the fact that the 
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and that the number of people in the Council of Europe (which 
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around 800 million, and that countries in former Soviet Union have 
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22 Stanev at para. 121.
23 Id.
24 Id. at para. 122.
25 Id.
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